Buyer Market Power in UK Food Retailing by Lloyd, Tim A. et al.
LAND ECONOMY WORKING PAPER SERIES
___________________________________________________________________
Number 22. Buyer Market Power in UK Food Retailing
Corresponding Author:
Habtu Tadesse Weldegebriel




Tel:  0131-535- 4025
E-Mail: Habtu.Weldegebriel@sac.ac.ukBuyer Market Power in UK Food Retailing 
Tim Lloyd, Steve McCorriston, Wyn Morgan, and Habtu T. 
Weldegebriel* 
Abstract 
The potential existence of buyer market power in UK food retailing has attracted the 
scrutiny  of  the  UK's  anti-trust  authorities,  culminating  in  the  decision  to  launch  the 
second of two comprehensive regulatory inquiries in recent years. Throughout, detection 
of buyer power has been dogged by the paucity of reliable evidence of its existence. In 
this paper we present a simple theoretical model of oligopsony which delivers quasi-
reduced form retailer-producer pricing equations in which the presence of market power 
can  be  detected  using  readily  available  market  data.  Using  a  cointegrated  vector 
autoregression,  we  find  empirical  results  that  are  consistent  with  the  presence  of 
oligopsony power in all six food products investigated. 
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In common with many national retail food markets in Europe, the rising degree of market 
concentration in the UK food sector has been a cause of concern to both consumer groups 
and food producers in recent years. By 2005, the four leading food retailers in the UK had 
a combined share of the grocery market of around 75 per cent, with the largest of these 
accounting for around one-third of all food sales (Office of Fair Trading, 2006). The issue 
has also aroused the attention of the UK's principal anti-trust authority, the Competition 
Commission, which published a report of its first statutory inquiry in 2000. A key issue 
highlighted in that report was the extent to which retailers can exert buyer power over 
their suppliers and the impact this has on consumer choice and competition in the food 
chain (Competition Commission 2000). It concluded that while there was only limited 
potential for abuse of market power with respect to consumers, there were grounds for 
significant concern regarding food retailers’ relationships with suppliers, highlighting 27 
oligopsonistic practices that specifically gave cause for concern. Despite the subsequent 
imposition  of  a  Supermarket  Code  of  Practice  in  2002  effectively  outlawing  such 
practices,  concerns  over  buyer  power  remain  in  the  Office  of  Fair  Trading's  recent 
decision to refer the supermarkets to a further Competition Commission inquiry (Office 
of Fair Trading, 2006). 
These concerns were most cogently illustrated by the nature of trading between retailers 
and suppliers of “fresh”  food products in that 'Generally, suppliers of fresh produce 
appear to be most dependent on their largest main party customers [big supermarkets] for their sales' (Competition Commission 2000 11.15, p232) and '. . . most suppliers of 
fresh fruit and vegetables meat and poultry . . . appear to concentrate on trade with a 
limited number of suppliers (often four or less)' (Competition Commission 2000 11.8 
p.231). Indicative figures from the food industry underline this reliance with some 75%1
of total UK output of apples and 80%2 of total UK fresh potato output being sold to the 
supermarkets. Around 65% of liquid milk sales are accounted for by the main food 
retailers (KPMG, 2002). With respect to meat products, the data are more indirect in that 
they  relate  to  consumption  of  meat  via  the  retail  sector  as  a  whole  rather  than  the 
supermarkets  alone,  though  given  their  share  of  consumer  markets,  the  figures  are 
informative of the likely  dominance  in  the procurement market.  With  this  caveat in 
mind,  the  data  show  that  85%  of  beef  is  consumed  via  the  retail  sector,  with  the 
corresponding figures for pork and lamb being 81% and 90% respectively. 
Establishing detailed empirical evidence of the existence of buyer power, however, is 
problematic. Indicative measures often rely on anecdotal accounts, small-scale surveys of 
the  parties  involved  or  at  a  more  representative  level,  summary  measures  of 
concentration.  Relating  simple  measures  of  concentration  to  the  existence  of  selling 
power has long been recognised as of limited value and the same is true for buying power 
(Clarke et al, 2002). For example, the high levels of concentration evident in the UK food 
retailing sector, coupled with the high profits they report, is not necessarily indicative of 
the exploitation of market power. Similarly, there is a spectrum of econometric 
                                                approaches that may be employed to detect market power. Where estimation is based 
upon  price  data  alone,  such  as  in  orthodox  price  transmission  studies  (e.g.  London 
Economics, 2004) the veracity of antitrust inference is undermined by the reduced form 
nature of the price regressions employed (Hoehn et al. 1999, p.113). Although structural 
econometric models address this issue of 'measurement without theory' directly, they are 
often confounded by data limitations and methodological shortcomings relating to market 
definition  and  the  validity  of  the  behavioural  assumptions  employed  (Baker  and 
Bresnahan,  1992).  In  these  circumstances,  a  simple  and  reliable  test  derived  from 
economic theory detecting the existence of market power offers some appeal, and it is in 
this regard that this paper seeks to make a contribution. Specifically, we provide such a 
test by devising a simple quasi-reduced form model of price formation at retailer and 
supplier levels in which the hypothesis of buyer power can be readily tested using widely 
available  market-level  data.  While  the  approach  does  not  aim  to  derive  an  explicit 
measure of market power, it does provide a test for its existence, emphasising the test's 
'path-finder' role alongside extant sources of indicative evidence. 
In terms of the academic literature, the test proposed here lies between two related fields 
in the industrial organisation literature. At one end is the estimation of structural models 
in the context of the new empirical industrial organisation literature. Bresnahan (1989) 
provides  an  overview.  The  key  feature  of  this  methodology  is  the  use  of  exogenous 
shocks (such as exogenous shifts in the demand or supply functions) in order to identify 
                                                                                                                                                the presence of market power. From this one can retrieve a measure of the aggregate 
conjectures representing the degree of market power in a specific market. In the approach 
followed here, we also employ exogenous shocks as a means to detect the potential for 
market power. At the other end is the empirical literature on the incidence of policy 
changes (such as tax changes) or other shocks since the incidence of taxes may differ in 
the  presence  of  market  power.  Fuerstein  (2002)  and  Delipalla  and  O’Donnell  (2001) 
would  be  recent  examples.  The  approach  followed  here  relates  to  these  empirical 
strategies in that we exploit the presence of exogenous shocks in order to identify the 
presence of market power based on a theoretical model of the incidence of shocks on 
both upstream and downstream prices. As we explain below, the detection of market 
power  simply  depends  on  how  these  shocks  affect  both  sets  of  prices.  While  the 
simplicity of the approach does not allow us to retrieve an empirical estimate of the 
degree of market power the trade-off does circumvent some of the obstacles inherent in 
the estimation of structural econometric modelling and the difficulties associated with the 
interpretation of estimated conjectures. 
More specifically, in the framework we present, the difference (or spread) between prices 
at different marketing levels can be attributed solely to marketing costs under competitive 
conditions. In other words, shocks impact on prices at each marketing level equally. If 
market power exists then the spread between retail and producer supply prices behaves 
differently since price setting by the sector with market power will be reflected in the 
mark down that the firms can earn, and so affects the spread. Hence, as we show in 
section 2, where buyer power exists, market shocks have a differential impact at each stage in the marketing chain and thus determine the behaviour of the spread between 
prices  at  different  stages  in  addition  to  marketing  costs.  In  effect,  shocks  to  the 
underlying supply and demand functions are mediated through market power parameters 
and thus give rise to predictable effects on the spread. In the absence of market power, 
the  effect  of  shocks  is  common  at  all  market  levels  so  that  the  spread  is  simply 
determined by marketing costs. 
In what follows, we develop a model of price transmission in a two-stage vertical market 
that explicitly allows for shocks in both the demand and supply functions for the product. 
Moreover, given that the impact of shocks appears with definite sign in the theoretical 
model of the spread, the basis for reliable inference is strengthened accordingly. Our 
approach is applied to  data from six  food groups in the UK food industry. For each 
product, the empirical test rejects the null of perfect competition at conventional levels of 
significance. Furthermore, coefficients on the exogenous shifters are signed according to 
the predictions in the theoretical model in all cases. The paper is structured as follows. In 
Section  1  we  outline  the  theoretical  model  that  underpins  our  conceptualisation  of  a 
vertically related market. The econometric techniques employed are discussed in Section 
2 while Section 3 describes the data. The results of the testing procedure are outlined in 
Section 4 and we offer some concluding thoughts and caveats in Section 5. 
1. Theoretical Model In this section, we outline a simple framework that delivers a formal test of market versus 
perfect competition that we use to motivate the empirical analysis. The demand function 
for the processed product is given by: 
) 1 ( ) , ( D R h Q 
where R is the retail price of the good under consideration and D is a general demand 
shifter. The supply function of the agricultural raw material is given by (in inverse form):
) 2 ( ) , ( S A k P 
where A is the quantity of the agricultural raw material and S is the exogenous shifter in 
the farm supply equation.
In accordance with the findings of the Competition Commission (op. cit.) the source of 
market power in the food chain is given to be at the retail level. For a representative retail 
firm, the profit function is given by:
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where  i C  is other costs and, assuming a fixed proportions technology,  a A Q i i /  where a 
is the input-output coefficient which is assumed to equal 1. This assumption corresponds 
closely to the construction of the data in the vertical market chain used in the empirical 
analysis that follows. Constant returns to scale are assumed. The first-order condition for 
































In order to get an explicit solution, consider linear functional forms for equations (1) and 
(2) and assume a=1 (which is consistent with the construction of the data series): a=1) ' 1 ( cD bR h Q   
) ' 2 ( gA k P  
with domestic supply being given by:
S Q A  
where S is the exogenous supply shifter. From this we can rewrite (4) as: 
) ' 4 ( gQ P M R    
where μ is the aggregate input conjectural elasticity , such that with n firms in the retail 
sector, μ = (Σ
i [∂A/∂A
i][A
i/A])/n. This parameter can be interpreted as an index of buyer 
market  power  with  μ=0  representing  competitive  behaviour  and  1=μ  representing 
collusive behaviour. While μ is the measure of buyer power, as noted above, we do not 
aim to derive an explicit value for this parameter, but test only for its existence. M is a 
composite variable that represents all other costs that affect the retail-farm price margin. 
To allow for changes in costs, we assume a linear marketing cost function of the form: 
) 5 ( zE y M  
where y is a constant and represents the costs of inputs from the marketing sector (for 
example, wages). Using (1’), (2’), (4’) and (5), we can derive an explicit solution for the 
endogenous variables: 
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To derive the spread between retail and producer prices, use (7) and (8) to give: ) 9 (
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Note that if oligopsony power does not matter in determining the retail-producer price 
spread (i.e. μ=0), then equation (9) reduces to: 
) 10 ( M zE y P R    
i.e. the source of the retail-producer price margin in a perfectly competitive industry is 
due to changes in marketing costs only. In this case, the exogenous shifters relating to the 
retail and agricultural supply functions play no role in determining the spread. This is not 
to  say that  they  do  not  affect  each  price  individually, but  in  a  perfectly  competitive 
industry they play no role in determining the relative gap between the prices at each stage 
of the food chain. Correspondingly, if oligopsony power in the food sector is important, 
each shifter affects the two prices differentially and thus the margin between the prices 
changes. 
Equations  (7)-(9)  form  the  basis  of  our  econometric  modelling.  Consider  first  of  all 
equation (9) that relates to the retail-producer spread. Note that if buyer market power 
does characterise the UK food sector, then the supply and demand shifters should enter 
our econometric model of the margin between retail and producer prices. Writing the 
margin equation in unrestricted form (i.e. in terms of prices) gives an empirical testing 
equation, 
) 11 ( 4 3 2 1 0 N X M P R          
From (9) and (10), β1>0, and β2>0 irrespective of the degree of retail competition. The 
test for the existence of buyer power is whether the coefficients on these variables in the 
retail-producer spread equation are statistically significant. Specifically, rejection of the 
null hypothesis, 0 : 4 3 0     H
implies the existence of buyer market power. Furthermore, equation (9) unambiguously 
signs the effect of the shifters in the presence of market power. Whereas shocks to the 
demand  shifter  widen  the  margin,  supply-side  shocks  narrow  it,  hence  if  market  the 
shifters are significant in the margin equation, theory predicts that β3>0 and β4<0 in (11). 
In the empirical section, we test these propositions using data for six product groups. 
2. Empirical Method 
To allow for the possibility that retail and producer prices of each product group are non-
stationary and cointegrated, we couch the empirical analysis in a vector autoregressive 
(VAR) framework. For each of the six product groups it is assumed that the data may be 
approximated by a VAR(p) model, 
) 12 ( ... 2 2 1 1 t t p t p t t t D x x x x              
where  t x is a (k*1) vector of jointly determined I(1) variables,  t D is is a (d*1) vector of 
constants  and  centered  seasonals  and  each  ) ,..., 1 ( p i i   and  Ψare  (k*k)  and  (k*d) 
matrices of coefficients to be estimated using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of data.  t  is is a 
(k*1) vector of n.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and non-diagonal covariance matrix,  Σ 
Equation (12) represents an unrestricted reduced form representation of the variables in 
t x  comprising retail and producer prices, a measure of marketing costs and the supply 
and demand shifters. Given the monthly frequency of the data, lag length (p) of the VAR 
is determined for each product group in step-wise fashion (p=13,12,…,1) using standard information criteria and vector-based diagnostics. The preferred lag length is thus the 
most parsimonious model that is free of residual correlation at the 5% significance level. 
The  presence  of  cointegration  is  detected  by  estimating  (12)  in  its  error  correction 
representation using Johansens’s (1988) maximum likelihood procedure, 










Attention  focuses  on  the  (k*r)  matrix  of  co-integrating  vectors,  comprising  β,  that 
quantify the ‘long-run’ (or equilibrium) relationships between the variables in the system 
and  the  (k*r)  matrix  of  error  correction  coefficients,  α,  the  elements  of  which  load 
deviations from equilibrium (i.e. k t x  '  ) into Δx
t, for correction. The Γi coefficients in 
(13) estimate the short-run effect of shocks on Δx
t, and thereby allow the short and long-
run responses to differ. The number of cointegrating relations, corresponding to the rank 
of β in (12), is evaluated by Johansen’s Trace (ηr) and Maximal Eigenvalue (ξr) test 
statistics  (Johansen,  1988).  The  ηr  statistic  tests  the  null  that  there  are  at  least  r 
cointegrating relationships (0≤r<n) and the ξr evaluates the null that there are r against 
the alternative that there are at most r+1 such relationships. While the ηr test is generally 
preferable  because  it  is  robust  to  residual  non-normality  and  delivers  a  sequentially 
consistent  test  procedure,  it  is  standard  practice  to  report  both  test  statistics.  In  the 
empirical  analysis  that  follows  we  also  report  both  asymptotic  and  the  degree-of-
freedom-adjusted test statistics of Cheung and Lai (1993). Where a single cointegrating relationship is detected, formal testing is undertaken to 
investigate whether buyer power is implied. Following from section 2, if the vertical 
market for a product is perfectly competitive, retail and producer prices may be expected 
to form a cointegrated relationship with at most marketing costs. Where retailers exert 
buying power, the shifters also enter the pricing relationship. This then gives rise to a 
null hypothesis of perfect competition which can be evaluated empirically by a standard 
likelihood  ratio  test  of  the  exclusion  restrictions  on  the  shifters  in  the  cointegrating 
relation. In addition, given that the theoretical model signs the parameters in the pricing 
relation  we  can  offer  some  additional  evidence  on  market  power  by  comparing  the 
estimated signs of the shifters in the cointegrating relation with that predicted by the 
theoretical model. 
3. Data From The Food Industry
In this paper we focus on six products to explore the presence of market power. We use 
fresh products as these are subject to the smallest degrees of processing by the post-farm 
gate chain prior to the food reaching the retail shelves, and thus potentially provide a 
clearer correspondence between theory and data. Further, given this limited processing, 
it is more readily acceptable to envisage production along the supply chain as being 
characterised by fixed proportions technology, as in the theoretical model. Finally, as the 
introduction  highlighted,  the  fresh  food  sector  is  more  likely  to  reveal  areas  of 
asymmetry in bargaining since this is where small suppliers predominate and thus where 
evidence of market power is most likely to be found. We analyse the nominal monthly prices of six UK food products, namely: apples (A); 
beef (B); chicken (C); lamb (L); milk (M) and potatoes (Pt) at retail (R) and producer (P) 
levels. In addition, each price model includes three industry-level ‘shifters’ representing 
proxies  for  marketing  costs  and  shocks  to  the  demand  and  supply  functions.  As 
discussed above, retail and producer product prices are expressed in prices per standard 
unit (pence/kg of carcass weight for all meats; pence/pint for liquid milk, pence/lb for 
potatoes, and apples are an index [1987=100] of prices in pence/lb). The price series are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here]
As  Figure  1  illustrates,  there  is  considerable  variation  in  the  price  series  between 
products and across marketing levels, although a tendency to diverge over time is a 
common feature While growth in the price spread is not in itself indicative of market 
power (marketing costs may account for it), it is necessary given the strong trend-like 
behaviour of the shifters, which are plotted in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here]
Referring to Figure 2, it is evident that all shifters display the tendency to grow over 
time.  As  noted  in  section  1,  measures  of  product-specific  marketing  costs  are  not 
available in the UK and thus we use an index of unit wage cost index for manufacturing 
industries  (M),  given  the  labour  intensity  of  the  food  retailing  sector.  In  order  to 
incorporate the impact of farm-level production costs, the supply shifter (S) represents a 
price index of all goods and services purchased on UK farms. Demand-side shocks are 
proxied by two measures. For meat products, we have a direct measure reflecting health scares  with  respect  to  the  consumption  of  meat  products.  Specifically,  we  use  the 
(natural logarithm of the) cumulative count of articles regarding the health and safety of 
food  published  in  four  broadsheet  newspapers  (D1),  on  the  basis  that  such  articles 
principally relate to or affect the demand for meat, rather than non-meat products. For 
non-meat products, no obvious direct demand shifter was available. For this case, we 
therefore use the food retail price index (D2) on the basis that this represents a general 
demand shifter affecting the food retailing sector as a whole. The application of the 
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test  indicates  that  all  prices  and  shifters  are  integrated  of 
order one in levels and stationary in first differences. ADF test statistics are reported in 
the Appendix.
4. Results 
Having established the non-stationarity of the data, equation (13) is estimated for each of 
the six product groups sequentially for k = 13 to 1. Since there is no consensus on the best 
criterion to use to determine lag length, three commonly applied measures are used here, 
namely the information criteria developed by Shartwz, Hannan-Quinn and Akaike (SBC, 
HQC  and  AIC  respectively)  and  vector  diagnostic  tests  for  residual  autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity and normality. The SBC tends to select the most parsimonious model 
and the AIC the least with the HQC selecting a lag length that is generally common to 
one of the other two, in roughly equal measure. In only one case (milk) is the lag length 
selected  unanimously  by  the  three  information  criteria.  The  vector  test  for  residual 
autocorrelation tends to select models with longer lag lengths and hence concur with the 
AIC in most cases. To determine the preferred lag length, a consensus view is taken, 
although this usually conforms to the most parsimonious model in which the null of no residual correlation cannot be rejected at the 5% level. In many cases, test statistics reject 
the null of (residual) normality emphasizing that care should be exercised in interpreting 
results. The selected models are unrestricted reduced forms and represent the baseline 
models against which all subsequent parameter restrictions are evaluated. 
Having  established  lag  length,  the  cointegrating  rank  is  evaluated  in  the  selected 
specification for each product group. Table 1 reports the results from the cointegration 
analysis using the Trace (ηr) and maximal Eigenvalue (ξr) tests in asymptotic (∞) and 
finite sample (T-mp) forms (Cheung and Lai, 1993). Overall, the evidence points to the 
presence of a single cointegrating vector in all product groups. Evaluating hypotheses at 
the 5% significance level, the null of no cointegration is rejected in 11 out of 12 tests 
using asymptotic critical values and on 9 out of 12 occasions using degree-of-freedom-
adjusted critical values. Confining inference to the more stringent (degree-of-freedom-
adjusted)  tests,  every  product  has  at  least  one  statistic  rejecting  the  null  of  no 
cointegration at the 5% level. In the three cases where the null cannot be rejected at 5%, 
only one is above 10%. No finite sample statistics reject the null of multiple cointegrating 
vectors at the 5% level of significance. Table 1: Asymptotic (∞) and Finite Sample Test Statistics for Cointegration 




Apples 0 83.77[0.002]** 36.88[0.018]* 77.87[0.009]** 34.28[0.041]**
1 46.89[0.060] 23.28[0.165] 43.59[0.118] 21.64[0.247]
2 23.62[0.224] 16.36[0.213] 21.95[0.311] 15.20[0.286]
3 7.26[[0.554] 4.66[0.782] 6.75[0.613] 4.33[0.819]
4 2.60[0.107] 2.60[0.107] 2.42[0.120] 2.42[0.120]
Beef 0 78.75[0.007]** 40.89[0.004]** 71.18[0.037]* 36.96[0.017]*
1 37.86[0.312] 23.90[0.140] 34.22[0.495] 21.60[0.250]
2 13.96[0.843] 7.29[0.932] 12.62[0.905] 6.59[0.959]
3 6.67[0.622] 5.11[0.729] 6.03[0.695] 4.62[0.787]
4 1.56[0.211] 1.56[0.211] 1.41[0.235] 1.41[0.235]
Chicken 0 85.85[0.001]** 35.92[0.024]* 76.84[0.011]* 32.15[0.077]
1 49.93[0.030]* 26.21[0.072] 44.69[0.095] 23.46[0.158]
2 23.72[0.219] 14.84[0.313] 21.24[0.353] 13.28[0.441]
3 8.89[0.383] 6.24[0.590] 7.96[0.477] 5.59[0.671]
4 2.65[0.104] 2.65[0.104] 2.37[0.124] 2.37[0.124]
Lamb 0 82.11[0.003]** 34.23[0.042]* 75.15[0.016]* 31.32[0.097]
1 47.88[0.048]* 25.79[0.082] 43.83[0.113] 23.61[0.152]
2 22.09[0.303] 15.68[0.254] 20.22[0.419] 14.35[0.351]
3 6.41[0.651] 5.25[0.712] 5.87[0.713] 4.81[0.765]
4 1.16[0.281] 1.16[0.281] 1.06[0.302] 1.06[0.302]
Milk 0 103.04[0.000]** 61.83[0.000]** 96.83[0.000]** 58.11[0.000]**
1 41.20[0.183] 20.87[0.294] 38.72[0.275] 19.61[0.381]
2 20.33[0.411] 11.38[0.619] 19.11[0.496] 10.70[0.684]
3 8.95[0.377] 8.53[0.335] 8.41[0.430] 8.02[0.385]
4 0.42[0.517] 0.42[0.517] 0.39[0.530] 0.39[0.530]
Potatoes 0 67.89[0.069] 39.08[0.008]* 60.67[0.216] 34.92[0.033]
1 28.81[0.777] 13.35[0.857] 25.75[0.894] 11.93[0.925]
2 15.47[0.754] 10.93[0.662] 13.82[0.850] 9.77[0.767]
3 4.53[0.852] 3.43[0.904] 4.05[0.893] 3.07[0932]
4 1.10[0.295] 1.10[0.295] 0.98[0.322] 0.98[0.322]
**denotes significance at 1%; * denotes significance at 5%, and p=values are in parenthesis. Asymptotic (∞) are those of those of the 
Osterwald Lenum (1992) and finite sample (degree of freedom) adjusted test statistics are those of Cheung and Lai (1993) where the 
correction is (T-mp) where T is sample size and m is number of endogenous variables and p is the lag length in the VAR. 
On the basis of these results we proceed on the assumption that a single cointegrating 
vector is present for each product group. Normalising each vector on retail prices, the 
long-run coefficients and associated standard errors are reported in Table 2.  Recall that 
the theoretical model presented in section 2 signs these coefficients such that, β1>0 and 
β2>0; and where market power exists, β3>0 and β4<0. Referring to  the table  a  number of  points  seem  noteworthy.  First, price  transmission 
coefficients (β1) are positive in all cases and significantly so in all but potatoes. Second, 
marketing costs, as proxied by labour costs in manufacturing, (β2) are positive in three 
cases, significantly so in two. Third, the demand shifter coefficient (β3) is significantly 
positive  in  the  cointegrating  relations  of  four  out  of  six  products;  and  fourth,  the 
coefficient on the supply shifter is significantly negative for all six products. 
Table 2: The Cointegrating Vectors (normalised on retail prices) 
























































Figures in bracket are asymptotic standard errors; ** denotes significance at the 1% and *denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Of key interest are the last two results which indicate that the shifters play an important 
role in the long run determination of prices, and enter the cointegrating relations with 
signs that are consistent with the use of retail market power. To investigate this issue 
more  formally,  we  perform  a  second  set  of  likelihood  ratio  tests  to  evaluate  these 
exclusion  restrictions,  results  from  which  are  contained  in  Table  3.  The  first  two 
columns test the individual significance of each shifter in each cointegrating vector and 
thus perform the same role as the standard errors in Table 2. Results are similar, with the 
statistical significance of the shifters being confirmed in 10 out of 12 occasions at the 
5% level. The final column of Table 3 evaluates the null hypothesis that both shifters are jointly zero. This corresponds to perfect competition  in the theoretical model and is 
rejected in  all six  products studied.  Overall, the behaviour of prices in  the products 
considered here are consistent with the use of buyer power. 
   Table 3: Tests for Market Power 
Product  H0=β3=0 H0=β4=0 H0=β3= β4
Apple  6.38 [0.01]*  3.86 [0.05]*  7.04 [0.03]* 
Beef  4.06 [0.04]*  10.76 [0.00]**  11.12 [0.00]** 
Chicken  4.12 [0.04]*  0.47 [0.49]  26.48 [0.00]** 
Lamb  4.69 [0.03]*  8.34 [0.00]**  15.50 [0.00]** 
Milk  0.66 [0.42]  5.83 [0.02]*  7.71 [0.02]* 
Potatoes  18.14 [0.00]**  16.1 [0.00]**  18.30 [0.00]** 
Figures in bracket are asymptotic p-values; ** denotes significance at the1% and 
*denotes significance at the 5% level 
Returning to the results presented in Table 2, there are two caveats to note. First, while 
the theoretical model additionally implies that β1=1, this condition is not borne out in the 
empirical setting. This may be due to heterogeneity within product groups and other 
practical factors such as wastage and product specification that interfere with the strict 
one-to-one correspondence of the theoretical model. Second, with respect to marketing 
costs, the significantly negative marketing cost coefficients in the models for apples and 
potatoes are at odds with the theoretical model outlined above. This is likely to reflect 
the inadequacy of a general marketing cost variable in these cases and/or that we are not 
picking-up  specific  trends  in  marketing  technology  or  costs  in  these  two  sectors. 
Notwithstanding these two caveats, the overall results give considerable support for the 
exercise of oligopsony power in the food sector. 5. Concluding comments 
In this paper, we have devised a simple yet robust means of testing for the presence of 
buyer power in vertically-related markets such as those characterising the food chain. By 
constructing a quasi-reduced form model of the retailer-supplier pricing equations, the 
null of perfect competition can be rejected if the shifters from the supply and demand 
equations are significant and correctly signed. In principle, the approach sits between 
other methods of evaluation, to which it is complementary. In particular, we are able to 
move away from naïve concentration-based indicators of market power and the practical 
limitations of structural econometric modelling. The approach is simple and transparent 
yet delivers a statistical test derived from a theoretically consistent basis. Furthermore, 
the  test  demands  relatively  little  in  terms  of  data  and  is  executed  using  standard 
techniques of modern time-series analysis. 
The technique is most applicable where products undergo relatively little transformation 
between  marketing  levels  and  is  thus  particularly  well-suited  to  the  relatively 
unprocessed products of the food chain. In the UK at least, these are also products over 
which concerns of buyer power abuse have been most acute. Drawing on data from a 
basket of six basic products of the UK food industry, we show that in all cases, the 
hypothesis  of  perfect  competition  can  be  firmly  rejected  at  conventional  levels  of 
significance, implying that for these food products at least, the market is characterised 
by  buyer  power.  As  such,  our  findings  corroborate  the  findings  of  Competition Commission (2000) and lend support to the recent request by the Office of Trading for 
further detailed scrutiny of the UK food chain by the UK’s competition authorities. 
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Levels  First-differences 
Variable 
ADF  Lag  ADF  Lag 
RA 
-2.67  0  -10.88**  0 
PA  -2.38  4  -6.94**  9 
RB  -1.88  0  -12.70**  0 
PB  -2.49  1  -8.41**  0 
RBr 
-2.74  0  -7.77**  1 
PBr  -2.91  1  -9.49**  1 
RC  -1.52  3  -11.10**  2 
PC  -2.38  4  -4.13**  3 
RL 
-1.83  6  -7.22**  6 
PL  -1.50  6  -8.27**  5 
RP 
-1.67  0  -11.20**  0 
PP  -2.24  8  -6.68**  5 
RM 
-1.14  3  -7.78**  2 
PM  -2.11  13  -7.29**  1 
RPt 
-2.12  0  -11.30**  0 
PPt -2.61  2  -8.16**  1 
RE 
-2.75  1  -9.46**  1 
PE  -2.86  5  -2.97*  4 
S 
-2.61  12  -3.06*  10 
D1  -1.93  3  -3.18*  3 
D2  -2.37  0  -12.02**  0 
M  -1.26  9  -3.92**  7 
Lag length is selected on basis of the information criteria (see main text for details). Regressions include constant, trend 
and seasonals (if appropriate) in the levels; constant (and seasonals) only in first differences. 95% (*) and 99% (**) 
critical values are -3.45 and -2.88 respectively. 